Showing posts with label motion for summary judgement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label motion for summary judgement. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 07, 2013

Copyright Law - First Circuit: Are Translations Copyrightable?

Translations of Ancient Texts, Originality,  Substantial Similarity, Derivative Works, Motion for Summary Judgment

Society of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Archbishop Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (First Circuit August 2, 2012).   Monastery is holder of copyright to translations of ancient texts.  Archbiship Gregory copied texts and put them on the internet.  Monastery sued.   Monastery did not lose rights to texts under “general publication” doctrine under the 1909 Copyright Act.  Translations were original and copyrightable.  Use of texts not fair use.  Lengthy analysis of monastic statutes showing that Monastery the true owner.  Translations may be original and copyrightable, despite being derivative of another product that may be in the public domain.

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Friday, July 12, 2013

Copyright Law - Ninth Circuit: Was Raging Bull Asleep At the Wheel? An Unusual Laches Case

Copyright Infringement, Unjust Enrichment, Laches, Equitable Estoppel, Motion for Summary Judgment, Rule 11 Sanctions, Attorneys Fees

Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 695 F.3d 946 (Ninth Circuit August 29, 2012).  Petrella owns renewal copyright in Raging Bull book and two screenplays.    Her father wrote the book and screenplays and died in 1981.  She filed a renewal application in 1991.  In 1998 her attorney wrote to defendants claiming that Raging Bull was an infringement of her copyright.  An exchange of letters was had, ending in 2000.   Petrella filed this action in 2009.  The district court granted summary judgment on the equitable defense of laches.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.   The Ninth Circuit opined that laches bars a copyright owner’s claim where a plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts, acquiesces in a transaction and sleeps upon his rights.  A defendant must prove (1) the plaintiff delayed in initiating the lawsuit; (2) delay was unreasonable; and (3) the delay resulted in prejudice.   Plaintiff claimed that she had delayed for personal reasons, together with the fact that the film had not made any money.  The Ninth Circuit analyzed two types of prejudice: expectations-based prejudice and evidentiary prejudice.  The Ninth Circuit focused on the many investments that the producers continued to make in Raging Bull during the relevant time period and found that they had been prejudiced caused by Petrella’s delay.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of damages.  The opinion provoked a dissent that pointed out that the Ninth Circuit is the jurisdiction most hostile to copyright owners and out of synch with other jurisdictions.   The dissent reasoned that the majority opinion confounds the doctrine of equitable estoppel with laches and misuses the laches doctrine in a manner that is too broad and vague in a manner not intended by Congress.

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 Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2012-2013 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here  

Wednesday, July 03, 2013

Copyright Law - Second Circuit: DMCA Safe Harbor Under Storm - Was YouTube Willfully Blind?

Video, Streaming, Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Internet Service Provider, Motion for Summary Judgment, Safe Harbors from Copyright Infringement

 Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (Second Circuit April 5, 2012).  District court granted summary judgment holding that YouTube and Google were entitled to DMCA safe harbor protections for broadcasting 79,000 copyrighted videos from 2005 to 2009.   District court held that absent item-specific knowledge of each video triggering a takedown duty, YouTube was entitled to the safe harbor.  On appeal, Second Circuit upheld the standard, but remanded because a reasonable jury could conclude that YouTube had such knowledge.  The Second Circuit also referred the question of potential “willful blindness” for further factfinding.  The Second Circuit made clear that DMCA safe harbors, though, did not depend on monitoring systems being set up and that the DMCA does not create such an affirmative duty to monitor for potentially infringing content.  The issue of whether YouTube had the right and ability to control infringing content was also remanded.   In remanding, the Second Circuit noted that YouTube’s licensing of content to third parties presented “the closest case” for taking YouTube outside the provisions of the DMCA Safe Harbor, but that from the record it was not clear that any such allegedly infringed clips were involved in the third-party licensing transactions.


 www.dunnington.com
 Purchase Copyright Litigation Handbook 2012-2013 by Raymond J. Dowd from West here